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Labor law scholars and union advocates have written about setbacks
to individual and collective employee rights as the NLRA and section 7 in
particular have been more narrowly interpreted by the NLRB.' Board
Member Wilma Liebman has lamented the weakening of employee rights
that has accompanied globalization and the decline of organized labor.2
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1. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The N.L.R.B. 's Uncertain Future,
26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221 (2005) (noting that N.L.R.B.'s recent decisions weaken
rights of workers to engage in organizing and collective bargaining); William R. Corbett,
The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and
Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23 (2006) (criticizing N.L.R.B.'s narrow
interpretation and arguing N.L.R.A. protection should extend to nonunion employees
engaged in section 7 conduct); Lawrence E. Dube, N.L.R.B. in Decline, Distrusted, Board
Member, Union Leader, Say, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 106, June 4, 2007, at C-1
(quoting N.L.R.B. member Wilma Liebman and Bruce Raynor, president of Unite Here,
regarding the functional decline and narrowing interpretations of the N.L.R.A.). Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
2. Wilma B. Liebman, N.L.R.B. Member, Speech at the 33rd Annual Robert Fuchs
Labor Law Conference (Oct. 27, 2005); Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment:
Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 569, 572 (2007) ("Somewhere along the way, New Deal optimism has yielded to
raw deal cynicism about the law's ability to deliver on its promise."); Susan J. McGolrick,
Liebman Discusses N.L.R.A. 's Evolution From 'New Deal' to 'Raw Deal' for Workers,
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AFL-CIO General Counsel Jon Hiatt has also noted the narrowing of the
NLRA's coverage and protections, highlighting in particular the Board's
most recent decision that employees who are not represented by a union do
not have a Weingarten right to have assistance from a co-worker during an
investigatory interview. He criticized this as the Board holding "that there
is only one form of representation recognized by the Act and that it would
not allow the over 90 percent of workers who do not enjoy exclusive
representation or collective bargaining to have any taste of the benefits of
representation."3
Labor law scholar Charles Morris' latest book, The Blue Eagle at
Work,4 posits numerous legal hypotheses and methods for reviving worker
rights in the modem era. Because employees in private sector workplaces
are increasingly not organized or represented by a majority union,
Professor Morris proposes reviving basic tenets of the seventy-year-old
NLRA. In particular, Morris proposes using the section 7 right to "bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection" as an American bill of democratic rights in the
workplace.' Professor Morris advocates the use of a members-only non-
majority union (MONMU) as a step towards worker empowerment. A
non-majority union represents only a minority of employees in a bargaining
unit, yet Professor Morris contends that it may still represent and bargain
(non-exclusively) on behalf of its employee members. Section 8(a)(5)'s
duty to bargain with representatives of employees is not limited to section
9(a) exclusive majority unions, according to Morris.' The right to "freely
and easily join labor unions and effectively engage in collective
bargaining-which implicitly includes the rights of all employees, not just
those who comprise a bargaining-unit majority-is a fundamental human
right," which Morris notes is supported by the International Covenant on
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 210, Nov. 1, 2005, at C-I; see also Dube, supra note 1. See
infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text (discussing Weingarten rights).
3. Susan J. McGolrick, Union, Management Attorneys Disagree on Significance of
Recent N.L.R.B. Rulings, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 103, May 31, 2005, at C-I. Hiatt
referred to the N.L.R.B.'s decision in IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004).
4. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (Cornell Univ. Press 2005). The Blue Eagle refers to the
Blue Eagle "Codes of Fair Competition" promulgated under the precursor to the National
Labor Relations Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Section 7(a) of the
NIRA "guaranteed the right of employees 'to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing."' Id. at 9 n.51 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2000)).
5. See MORRIS, supra note 4, at 2-3 (citing Clyde Summers, Unions Without a
Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 531 (1990)).
6. Susan J. McGolrick, Members-Only Bargaining 'Long-Forgotten,' But Permitted
by N.L.R.A., Professor Argues, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 51, Mar. 17, 2005, at A-9.
7. Id.
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Civil and Political Rights, as well as the First Amendment right to freedom
of association.'
Some agree with the premise that non-majority unions support
employee rights and activism, while others point out the inadequacies of
non-majority unions. 9 The major weakness in the MONMU concept arises
when one supposes that the employer has a duty to recognize and bargain
with a MONMU-for this notion flies in the face of the long accepted
presumption in labor law that only a section 9(a) exclusive majority
representative has the right to demand and receive recognition and
bargaining.' ° Consequently, Professor Morris's interpretation of the NLRA
8. Id. at A-10.
9. Carol Brooke, Nonmajority Unions, Employee Participation Programs, and Worker
Organizing: Irreconcilable Differences?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1237, 1269 (2000)
(explaining how NMUs help workers to organize and achieve change); Cynthia Estlund,
Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319,
388 & n. 266 (2005) (citing trade unions and advocates that support the use of nonexclusive
nonmajority forms of employee representation); Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken:
Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195
(1993); Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions That Represent Less
Than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 637 (1993); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key
Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149 (1993)
(arguing that NMUs and employee caucuses are helpful to employees); Julie Yates Rivchin,
Building Power Among Low- Wage Immigrant Workers: Some Legal Considerations for
Organizing Structures and Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397 (2004)
(discussing advantages of non-majority unions); Clyde Summers, supra note 5, at 536
(1990) (arguing centrality of section 7 of N.L.R.A. improperly obscured by increased focus
on section 9(a) majority representative, and that non-majority union has right to represent its
members under section 7). Others point to shortcomings of non-majority unions, such as
their presumed inability to bargain collectively without violating section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
See Brooke, supra at 1239-40 (maintaining that NMUs cannot engage in collective
bargaining); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong?; Can
We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 136 (2003) (asserting problems with NMUs bargaining
based on section 8(a)(2) of N.L.R.A.).
It should be noted that there is some variance in terminology surrounding non-
majority unions (NMUs), or, as they are sometimes called, minority unions. This Article
will use the term members-only non-majority unions (MONMU) rather than minority
unions to avoid the confusing multiple meanings associated with the term "minority." One
might say that "minority" and "union" are both words that carry a pejorative connotation
and thus in combination, are unlikely to grow a brand in this market. "Non-majority"
obviously could be cast as a negative term as well, but it has the merit of clearly stating its
case, as does "members-only." Cf Joseph E. Slater, Do Unions Representing a Minority of
Employees Have the Right to Bargain Collectively?: A Review of Charles Morris, The Blue
Eagle at Work, 9 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 383 (2005) (using the term "minority union
bargaining" (MUB)).
10. Even Professor Morris notes that "conventional wisdom has come to assume that a
union must represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit before it can
represent or bargain on behalf of any employees." Nonetheless, he reflects that this
"popular notion" is "but latter-day conventional wisdom" and not the "original wisdom
contained in the language of the N.L.R.A." Charles J. Morris, Members-Only Collective
Bargaining: Rejecting Conventional Wisdom, LERA: PERSPECTIVES ONLINE COMPANION,
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and its precursor, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), on this
issue has been greeted with some skepticism, and he has responded to those
who are skeptical of his thesis." It seems significant that an employer's
duty to recognize and bargain with a MONMU did not fare well before the
NLRB in a recent challenge, which will be discussed in Part II of this
Article. The failure of this collective right may be predictive of the status
of other individual and mutual aid or protection rights of employees in
MONMUs, in particular, the Weingarten right of employees in a MONMU.
Section 7 of the Act contains these important employee rights in close
proximity: "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/Fall05-morris.htm (last
visited March 2, 2008). Professor Morris also discusses the filing of the first N.L.R.B. case
asserting this right in a case involving Dick's Sporting Goods, discussed in Part II of this
Article. Id. at 2. See also MORRIS, supra note 4, at 1 (beginning his argument that the Blue
Eagle of the NIRA is not extinct with this statement: "[A]lmost all Americans involved in
employment relations believe that a minority union has no right to engage in collective
bargaining, even where no majority union has yet been designated."). Id.
Section 9(a) of the Act provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
Another statutory concern regarding MONMUs lies in section 8(a)(2), which
provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2000). See David Rosenfeld,
Worker Centers: Emerging Labor Organizations-Until They Confront the National Labor
Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469, 504-510 (2006) (discussing problems
arising under N.L.R.A., section 8(a)(2) in particular, with respect to application of Professor
Morris's non-majority union theory). Rosenfeld notes: "Whether minority unions are
permitted under the N.L.R.A. is an important debate .... " Id at 509. See also Getman,
supra note 9 (discussing NMU problems with section 8(a)(2)).
11. Charles J. Morris, Minority Union Collective Bargaining: A Commentary on John
True's Review Essay on The Blue Eagle at Work and a Reply to Skeptics Regarding
Members-Only Bargaining Under the N.L.R.A., 27 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 180
(2006); see also Lisa Schur, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the
American Workplace, 31 LAB. STUD. J. 107, 108 (2006) (book review) (noting skepticism
regarding Morris' legal strategies for achieving recognition of minority unions in light of
current legal and political climate and N.L.R.B.'s narrowing of section 7 rights, citing
example of retraction of Weingarten rights for non-union workers).
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choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.' '
One might note that the promise of rights pursuant to exclusive
bargaining representative status under section 9(a) of the NLRA seems
great, but the reality is that few employees and unions gain access to these
rights today. 3 The exclusive representative concept is an "all or nothing"
approach that is presently undermining union organizing. 4 It seems that
the exclusivity principle for gaining a bundle of rights under the NLRA
worked well when unions were on the upswing, but it does not work on the
downswing of today's intensely competitive global labor economy. This is
likely because work will go to low-wage countries if too many labor
complaints arise and costs escalate in the United States. The workplace is
very different than it was seventy years ago. Workers are much more
mobile and they carry their skill sets with them. Workplaces are diffuse
with work spread among workers and clients, and employers are experts at
out-sourcing, subcontracting, and maximizing the efficiencies of temporary
help. 5 Big box stores offer low wage packages, and focus on customer-
friendly rather than employee-friendly work schedules. While access to the
bundle of rights provided under the NLRA has declined, there has been a
rise in individual rights originating from other federal and state laws that
emphasize worker protections. 6 In this modem day labor environment, it
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). See also Morris, supra note 11, at 207 (concluding that
employer's duty to bargain with a minority union for its members-only is based on the
broadly written language of section 7's right to bargain collectively); but see MORRIS, supra
note 4, at 156-57 (discussing distinctions between the first and second track of concerted
activities under section 7).
13. Only 7.5% of the private sector work force had union membership in 2007. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited March 2, 2008).
14. See John M. True, III, Review Essay: The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming
Democratic Rights in the American Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 181, 183
(2005) (discussing an "all or nothing" approach that worked in early days but became futile
in the late twentieth century). Professor Morris chose an interesting term when he titled one
chapter of his book "Obtaining Imprimaturs from the Labor Board and the Courts."
MORRIS, supra note 4, at 173 (emphasis added). The use of the word "imprimatur" seems to
capture Morris's perception that the Board process has grown too sanctified, too much of a
monopoly, and consequently there should be "alternative routes to legal acceptance" for
unions in light of the lack of success that unions are encountering with the N.L.R.B.'s
process for section 9(a) status. See id.
15. See Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century
Committee for Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L.J. 69, 83-84 (2005)
(discussing use of temporary help, impact of globalization driving employers search for
lower-cost labor, and practices of big box stores such as Wal-Mart).
16. See True, supra note 14, at 188 (discussing the "dramatic shift from collectively
bargained workplace rights to individual rights, some derived from statutes passed by
Congress and state legislatures and some mandated by common law judges"); see also
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is no wonder that unions have lost ground. Whether unions and their
members will be able to regain momentum and power in the workplace
through innovative use of MONMUs is another question. That question
will be answered in large part by how the Board interprets the relevant
statutory language when choosing between permissible interpretations, and
by what sections of the Act are deemed relevant to the legal issues raised.
Key sections of the NLRA that apply to employee rights, the legal status of
their representatives, and pertinent employer unfair labor practices are
outlined next to provide a context for the NLRB's consideration of the
legal issues surrounding Weingarten rights and the representational status
of MONMUs.
Section 7 of the Act entitled "Rights of Employees" specifically
addresses individual and collective fights of employees, including the right
to "engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."'17  The mutual aid or
protection language of section 7 is referenced as a basis for the Weingarten
right to have a representative at an investigatory interview that reasonably
might lead to discipline. Section 8 of the Act is entitled "Unfair Labor
Practices" and section 8(a) specifies the unfair labor practices for
employers.' 8 Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed" in section 7 and section 8(a)(2) further proscribes
employer labor practices "to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it."' 9 Section 8(a)(3) prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."20 Section
8(a)(3) permits mandatory union membership with certain provisos where
the labor organization is a section 9(a) representative.2' Section 8(a)(5)
provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively with representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions" of section 9(a).22
Section 9 of the NLRA is entitled "Representatives and Elections" and
section 9(a) states that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
Craver supra note 15, at 96 (noting difficulty in organizing with majority rule concept of
section 9(a)).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (2).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
21. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
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the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment., 23 The section further provides for an individual employee or
group of employees to present grievances to the employer and seek
adjustment as long as there is no conflict with a collective bargaining
agreement and the bargaining representative has been given the opportunity
to be present2 4 Section 9 of the Act contains other provisions that relate to
the process of bargaining unit determination, qualification for employee
status therein, the initiation of representation petitions, the certification of a
representative, and the impact of that certification.2 5 In order to attain the
status of a section 9(a) representative, a union must comply with the
requirements of the section and the precedents surrounding the described
requirements. For example, an employer may voluntarily recognize a
majority representative based upon a showing of valid union authorization
cards signed by employees, but the employer need not acquiesce to this
showing and may insist upon a Board-conducted secret ballot election.
There, a majority of those that are qualified to vote and are voting must
select the representative in order for the representative to attain section 9(a)
exclusive representative status. Clearly, a MONMU does not meet the
requirements of section 9(a) because it does not represent a majority,
cannot proffer cards from a majority, and is not able to succeed at a secret
ballot election absent support of a majority of those voting. Further, it
should be noted that no part of section 9 refers to non-majority
representatives or to investigatory interviews. Investigatory interviews are
different from presentation of grievances and their adjustment; they are
processes that tend to be formally prescribed within a collective bargaining
agreement.
The Board looks to the language of the statute itself, its legislative
history, and prior precedent when seeking to address matters before it. The
General Counsel of the NLRB has appellate authority over regional
directors' rulings on charges of unfair labor practices.26 This gives the
General Counsel significant authority in terms of interpreting the statute
and the application of prior precedent to changing times and issues.
Consequently, the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint on an
unfair labor practice is a significant setback to the claim that an unfair labor
practice exists as his discretion in this context is essentially not
reviewable. 21 In general, the courts accord rulings of the NLRB deference
23. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
24. Id.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159.
26. DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 49 (13th ed. 2007).
27. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2805 (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006).
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in light of the agency's expertise, and permit the Board to select between
permissible interpretations of the NLRA.2"
I. Is THERE A WEINGAR TEN RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION IN A MONMU?
An important question that is raised by Professor Morris' work is
whether employees who join a non-majority union are entitled to exercise
Weingarten rights. These rights are named after a 1975 United States
Supreme Court decision that affirmed an employee's right to request the
presence of a union representative at an employer's investigatory interview
when the employee reasonably believed that the interview might lead to
disciplinary action.' 9 In 2004, the National Labor Relations Board issued
IBM Corp. ,30 a controversial decision in which the Board withdrew
Weingarten rights from non-union workers. 3I Board Member Liebman has
referred to the IBM case as the "'most noteworthy' example of the board
narrowing workers' rights. 32  Professor Morris notes that after the IBM
decision, the "typical role of a union steward in a brand-new members-only
union will now be more important than ever in the organizational
process.,33  He advocates that a non-majority union can advertise the
Weingarten right among the employees in the bargaining unit as one of the
advantages of joining, and provide instant membership, upon execution of
a card, in the event that a non-union member suddenly finds himself facing
an investigatory interview. 34 Morris posits that "Weingarten rights can be
alive and well in the minority-union workplace" regardless of the "Board's
regressive decision in IBM.,, 35 The union steward exercising a Weingarten
right in a non-majority setting provides the union with an opportunity to
28. See N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975) (noting where
Board's construction of the Act "is a permissible construction ... [it] should have been
sustained.").
29. Id. at 251; see also MoRRIs, supra note 4, at 188-91 (discussing Weingarten rights).
30. 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004).
31. See Christine Neylon O'Brien, The N.L.R.B. Waffling on Weingarten Rights, 37
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 111 (2005) (reviewing the origin and recent history of the Weingarten
right, the National Labor Relations Board's changing perspective on the right for nonunion
workers, and analyzing some of the implications of the Board's IBM Corp. decision upon
section 7 rights); see infra notes 79-115 and accompanying text (discussing the IBM
decision with respect to assessing the prospect of Weingarten rights in a MONMU); see also
Sarah Helene Duggin, The Ongoing Battle Over Weingarten Rights for Non-Union
Employees in Investigative Interviews: What Do Terrorism, Corporate Fraud, and
Workplace Violence Have to Do With It?, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 655
(2006) (discussing Weingarten rights and the IBM decision).
32. See McGolrick, supra note 2, at C-1 (quoting Member Liebman's speech on
N.L.R.A.'s evolution and trend away from employee rights).
33. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 189.
34. Id. at 190.
35. Id.
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"demonstrate its importance by providing on-the-job worker
representation. 36 According to Morris, Weingarten rights can be used as
"an organizational tool that a minority union might use during the early
stages of its development., 37 Morris's theory merits further analysis of the
individual and collective rights that MONMU members presently have
under the NLRA.
II. EMPLOYER DUTY TO RECOGNIZE OR BARGAIN WITH A MONMU-
DICK'S SPORTING GOODS
Part of Morris's MONMU theory was recently tested in a case where a
non-majority union, Dick's Employee Council, filed unfair labor practice
charges concerning their employer's refusal to recognize and bargain with
them at Dick's Sporting Goods in Smithton, Pennsylvania.38 The union
organizing director there noted that he was following the tenets described
in Morris' Blue Eagle book.39 Dick's Employee Council was formed as a
dues-paying group of employees at Smithton, and it is an affiliate of the
United Steelworkers International Union.40 The Council was formed with
the intent of bargaining with the employer before reaching majority status
while eventually hoping to form a traditional local union, presumably one
with exclusive majority representation rights.4' The Council requested
bargaining on behalf of its members over a number of issues including:
discharge of one member, health and safety, and the need for a grievance
procedure. The employer refused to bargain with the Council.42  The
Council alleged violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) because the employer
refused to supply requested information on work-related injuries or
illnesses, told employees it was not obligated to bargain, and unilaterally
disciplined and discharged a council member.43  Apparently due to the
novelty of the issues presented in the charges, and perhaps due to the
Charging Party's explicit reliance on Morris's theory, the Director for
Region 6 of the NLRB requested advice as to whether to issue a complaint.
36. Id. at 191.
37. Morris, supra note 11, at 185.
38. See Jim McKay, Union Tries Very Old (New) Tactic to Organize Dick's Workers,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 4, 2005, at El (describing the Dicks' minority union's
efforts to force management negotiation).
39. Id.
40. N.L.R.B. Advice Memorandum, 6-CA-3482 1, at 1 & n. I (June 22, 2006), available
at http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/Advice%20Memos/2006/6-CA-34821 %2806-22-
06%29.pdf. The United Steelworkers International Union joined the Council as Charging
Party. Id.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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The Advice Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the Region should
dismiss the charge rather than issue a complaint since the employer had no
obligation to recognize or bargain with the Council. 44 The Memorandum
outlined its reasoning by refuting the Charging Party's theory that the
employer was obligated to bargain with a minority, members-only union.45
The Advice Memorandum looked to the language of the Act, its legislative
history, and cases interpreting the provisions, before concluding that the
concept of collective bargaining is "firmly based on the principle of
majority rule."46 The Memorandum outlined that enactment of section 9(a)
of the Act reflected Congress' rejection of other forms of representation
such as plural or proportional that had previously been permitted under the
NIRA.47 Explicit language that would have permitted minority bargaining
in the absence of a majority was discarded prior to enactment of section
9(a) of the NLRA, which indicates that minority bargaining is not required
under the Act.48 Senator Wagner himself, who sponsored the Act, outlined
the important reasons for majority rule as the "only rule that makes
collective bargaining a reality" and noted how "the unscrupulous
employer" could take advantage of minority groups by playing one off
against another.49 In addition, the Advice Memorandum noted that a
Senate report reflected upon majority rule as best for employers and
employees alike, and a House report repeated a similar rationale for
majority rule, namely that requiring employee representation by a union
with minority support would be unworkable. 0 From the legislative history,
the Division of Advice concluded that Congress saw minority bargaining as
undermining meaningful collective bargaining.
The Advice Memorandum in Dick's Sporting Goods noted that the
Supreme Court has upheld the importance of majority rule.
2 According to
the Memorandum, the duty to bargain is only required where there is a
majority representative because the section 8(a)(5) duty is premised on
section 9(a).53 While the Board may have allowed employers to recognize
44. Id.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Id. at 6-7.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 8 (citing LEON H. KEYSERL1NG, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT:
AFTER TEN YEARS 19-20 (Louis G. Silverberg ed. 1945)).
50. Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 9.
51. Id. at 9-10.
52. Id. at 10 (citing Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975)).
53. Id. at 11. The Memorandum noted that "the Board has never construed Section
8(a)(5) as operating independently from Section 9(a)." Id. Section 8 (a)(5) provides: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to refuse to bargain collectively with the
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and bargain with minority, member-only unions in the absence of a
majority union, the NLRA did not establish a duty to recognize or bargain
with a MONMU.
5 4
The Dick's Memorandum discussed the Board's 1972 decision in Don
Mendenhall.55 There, the employer, Don Mendenhall, was engaged in the
installation of floors and ceilings in residential and commercial
establishments. Mendenhall signed a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with a union and also authorized an employer association to
represent the company in bargaining. The union was a members-only one,
and the employer paid non-union employees the same wages as he did to
the union members but did not provide health and welfare benefits to the
non-union employees. 6 When the employer refused to bargain over the
subcontracting of residential work that the union claimed affected union
members, the Board dismissed a section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain charge
on the basis that the union was members-only. The union was not the
exclusive bargaining representative nor had it claimed to be. 57  The
employer had acquiesced to an arrangement whereby the union represented
only its members." Indeed, the initial grant of recognition by the employer
was for the "limited purpose of representing its members."5 9 Because of
the members-only nature, the Board concluded that Mendenhall's actions
"[could not] be held violative of Section 8(a)(5) . . . .That section, by
reference to Section 9(a), requires ... [an] exclusive representative .... It
has been settled since the early days of the Act that members-only
recognition does not satisfy statutory norms."6
The Advice Memorandum in Dick's Sporting Goods further noted that
no section 8(a)(1) bargaining order will be issued absent the prerequisite of
a union's majority status. 61 A majority was deemed necessary to effectuate
representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) of this title." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000). See supra note 10 for the language of section 9(a).
54. Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 11.
55. Id. at 12 (citing Don Mendenhall, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1972)).
56. Don Mendenhall, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1972).
57. Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 12 (citing Don Mendenhall, 194 N.L.R.B.
at 1109-10).
58. Don Mendenhall, 194 N.L.R.B. at 1109-10.
59. Id. at 1110.
60. Id. It should be noted that the Petition for Rulemaking, discussed infra note 73 and
accompanying text, at 56-61, takes significant issue with the General Counsel's
interpretation and use of the Don Mendenhall decision in the Division of Advice
Memorandum. The critical difference between Dick's and Don Mendenhall is that Dick's is
a MONMU whereas Don Mendenhall was a false majority case-a case where a union did
not have a majority but sought to act as a majority representative.
61. Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 13-14 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (bargaining based upon majority status from authorization cards)).
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"'ascertainable employee free choice."', 62 Similarly, the Board does not
require employers to recognize and bargain with a minority group of
unrepresented employees.63 Essentially, an employer may choose to deal
with employee grievances on an individual basis, absent a collective
bargaining agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative that
requires the employer to do otherwise. 64 Even where a union loses its
majority support, no obligation to discuss grievances with the union
remains, and no bargaining order will ensue.65
The Division of Advice Memorandum concluded that it would make
no sense to require an employer to bargain with a union that represents a
minority of employees when the Supreme Court has held that even where a
union represents a majority based upon authorization cards, the employer
need not recognize or bargain with that union. Instead, the employer may
insist upon an NLRB election with the burden on the union to petition the
Board.66 Ultimately, "the essence of industrial democracy, as contemplated
and enforced by the Act, is fundamentally based on majoritarian
principles., 67 Non-majority unions are simply not entitled to the same
rights as those that represent a majority under the NLRA in light of this
result. As the Office of the General Counsel summarized in its Report on
Case Developments for the period, the Dick's case was a significant one,
yet the Board did not view the issue as an open one. 68 The General Counsel
reported that they found that there was no section 8(a)(1) or (5) violation
since there is no statutory obligation to recognize or bargain with a
members-only union that does not represent a majority.69  While in the
early days of enforcement of the Act, the Board allowed an employer to
recognize and bargain with a members-only minority union, it did not
recognize a duty to do so."7 The General Counsel's Summary confirmed
62. Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 14 (quoting Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614).
63. Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 15.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 16.
66. Id. at 17-18 (citing Linden Lumber Div. v. N.L.R.B., 419 U.S. 301 (1974)).
67. Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 18.
68. See N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel Ronald Meisburg, Memorandum 07-02, Report on Case
Developments April through August 2006, at 25, 29 (Dec. 15, 2006). The Division of
Advice Memorandum in Dick's similarly noted:
We conclude that the Employer did not violate Section 8(a)(1) or (5) because
the Employer in these circumstances had no obligation under the Act to
recognize the Charging Party in the absence of a Board election establishing
that it represented a majority of the Employer's employees. This principle is
well-settled and is not an open issue.
Advice Memorandum, supra note 40, at 1.
69. General Counsel Memorandum, supra note 68, at 25, 29.
70. Id. at 28.
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that the Board will not issue a bargaining order absent a union's majority
status.7'
In response to the Board's failure to issue a complaint in the Dick's
Sporting Goods case, a group of law professors circulated a letter to the
chairman and members of the National Labor Relations Board.7 ' The letter
71. Id. at 29.
72. See Morris, Craver Circulate Proposed NLRB Rule,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2007/03/morris_craver c.html (last visited
March 2, 2008).
To the Honorable Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Board:
Re: Petition by the Steelworkers Union et al for issuance of a rule regarding
members-only minority-union collective bargaining
We, the undersigned, are law professors who specialize in the field of labor
law, including the law of the National Labor Relations Act. The purpose of this
letter is to acquaint the members of the Board with our considered opinion
concerning the pending petition for issuance of a substantive rule regarding
members-only minority-union collective bargaining.
It is our view that this rule should be promulgated for the following reasons:
(1) The plain and unambiguous language of the Act guarantees that in
workplaces where there is not currently a Section 9(a) majority-exclusive
representative in an appropriate bargaining unit, employees have an
enforceable right to bargain collectively through minority unions of their
own choosing, but for their employee members only.
(2) Such reading of the statute is supported by clear and consistent
legislative history.
(3) In his Advice Memorandum and Letter of Dismissal, the General
Counsel did not refute the foregoing reading of the Act nor did he contest
the foregoing reading of its legislative history.
(4) The Board has not heretofore decided this issue.
(5) By refusing to issue a complaint, the General Counsel failed to carry
out his proper role of placing unresolved legal issues before the Board for
its decision, for it is the function of the Board, not the General Counsel, to
resolve issues of pure statutory construction.
(6) By dismissing the charge in Dick's case, the General Counsel deprived
the Board of the opportunity to resolve this issue by adjudication, which
would have been in accord with its normal customary practice.
Pursuant to the substantive rulemaking procedures of Section 6 of the
National Labor Relations Act and Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. § 553), it is now appropriate for the Board to issue the rule
proposed by petitioner Steelworkers Union and its co-petitioners, and we urge
the Board to do so.
Adoption of this rule will clarify the bargaining requirements of the Act and
help to implement the intent of Congress that was declared in the Wagner Act of
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alleges that the General Counsel erred in refusing to issue a complaint
because minority union members also have the right to bargain collectively
under the Act, that this right is supported by the language of the statute and
legislative history, and that it is the Board's responsibility to resolve the
legal issue that has yet to be decided by it. The professors' letter
recommends adoption of a rule clarifying employees' right to organize and
bargain through minority unions on a members-only basis as a stepping
stone to majority-based bargaining. The Steelworkers, represented by
Professor Morris, and six other unions with their own counsel, have now
filed a petition at the NLRB seeking rulemaking on the issue of members-
only minority union collective bargaining, including the letter in support.
73
1935 (§ 1) and re-affirmed in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (§ 201(a)), to wit,
that it is the policy of the United States to encourage the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining. It is our view that protecting the employees' fight to
organize and bargain through minority unions on a members-only basis where
there is not currently a majority-exclusivity bargaining agent provides a useful
and often-needed steppingstone to majority-based Section 9(a) collective
bargaining, such as was commonly practiced during the first decade of the Act.
And it is our further view that the resulting enhancement of the collective
bargaining process will inure to the benefit of both employees and employers
and contribute to a healthier economy.
Respectfully submitted on behalf of the undersigned in our individual
capacities, not as spokespersons for any institution with whom we may be
affiliated.
[Signatures with identifying positions and affiliations]
Id. The letter was signed by twenty-five law professors and appended to the Rulemaking
Petition. See Labor Law Professors Endorsing Members-Only Non-Majority Collective
Bargaining Under The N.L.R.A., Aug. 14, 2007, available at
http://efcaupdate.squarespace.com/document-repository/
2007 -08-14 Labor Law Professors
Letter.pdf.
73. See Susan J. McGolrick, Unions File Rulemaking Petition With N.L.R.B. on
Minority-Union Members-Only Bargaining, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 157, Aug. 15,
2007, at A-1; In the Matter of Rulemaking Regarding Members-Only Minority-Union
Collective Bargaining, Petition of United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO,
(Steelworkers Union) and other labor organizations as interested parties, Seeking
Rulemaking before the National Labor Relations Board (Aug. 14, 2007) [hereinafter,
Petition for Rulemaking], available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/documents/PetitionRequestingRulemaking.pdf see also
Steven Greenhouse, Seven Unions Ask Labor Board to Order Employers to Bargain, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at A14 (discussing basis for petition and that twenty-five professors
signed the letter of support; noting union officials admit that it is unlikely that the current
Board dominated by Bush appointees would adopt rule, yet they hope that future
Democratic President may appoint members who will look favorably on unions' argument
in favor of bargaining with minority unions in absence of an exclusive majority union).
The rule proposed provides:
Pursuant to Sections 7, 8(a)(1), and 8(a)(5) of the Act, in workplaces where
employees are not currently represented by a certified or recognized Section
MONMUs & WEINGARTEN RIGHTS
The Change to Win (CTW) labor federation, representing seven
additional unions, recently filed a similar petition asking the NLRB to issue
a rule that federal labor law requires employers to bargain with a union
representing a minority in the absence of a union representing a majority.74
The CTW petition agreed with and adopted the reasoning of the
Steelworkers' August 2007 rulemaking petition and joined in proposing the
same rule. 75  The Petition also noted that the Advice Memorandum in
Dick's Sporting Goods relied upon "commentary and materials drawn from
a very different context-i.e., that of a union seeking or exercising
exclusive representation status," and that this context is not relevant to the
Petitioner's claims.76  CTW criticized the Advice Memorandum's
inappropriate evaluation of "serious arguments-that rest on clear and
unchallenged statutory language and history."77  Quoting language of
Justice Scalia, CTW noted that the Dick's Advice Memorandum "contains
much that is obviously true, and much that is relevant; unfortunately, what
is obviously true is not relevant, and what is relevant is not obviously
true. 78
III. THE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION IN MONMUS-THE PROSPECT ON
WEINGARTEN RIGHTS
As far as the representational rights of employees in a MONMU are
concerned, the Dick's Sporting Goods Advice Memorandum has made
clear that there is presently no obligation for an employer to recognize or
bargain with a union that does not represent a majority of employees in a
bargaining unit. Thus, an employer may insist upon meeting with
individuals rather than any collective group if there is no exclusive majority
representative. What does this portend for other representational rights of
9(a) majority/exclusive collective-bargaining representative in an appropriate
bargaining unit, the employer, upon request, has a duty to bargain collectively
with a labor organization that represents less than an employee-majority with
regard to the employees who are its members, but not for any other employees.
Petition for Rulemaking, supra at 6.
74. N.L.R.A., Change to Win Joins Other Unions Seeking Rule on Minority-Union
Bargaining, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 4, Jan. 8, 2008., at A-1. Change to Win
represents the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Laborers' International Union,
the Service Employees International Union, the Carpenters and Joiners of America, the
United Farm Workers, the United Food and Commercial Workers, and UNITE HERE. Id.
75. Id.
76. Petition of Change to Win, Rulemaking Regarding Members-Only Minority Union
Collective Bargaining, *7 (N.L.R.B. 2008), available at
http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=smgk-7amt9z.
77. Id. at *8.
78. Id. at *7-8 (citing National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 713
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
2008]
614 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:3
union members in a MONMU? Are they entitled to Weingarten rights
under current law? Three pieces of evidence are of considerable predictive
value: analysis of the language used in the various opinions in the IBM
decision regarding Weingarten rights, the precedents cited therein, and the
Supreme Court's original Weingarten decision itself.
A. The National Labor Relations Board's View-IBM Corp.
The 2004 IBM decision limited the right to have a Weingarten
representative at an investigatory interview that might reasonably result in
disciplining nonunion employees. The IBM decision may be read to limit
entitlement to Weingarten rights to majority union members or to union
members in general, depending upon which opinion one reads and how the
opinions of the various board members are interpreted. The issue is
important because if the distinction between union and nonunion hinges
upon section 9(a) exclusive majority status, then non-majority union
members will fall under the nonunion rule of IBM and not have Weingarten
rights. This is because MONMUs, by their very definition, do not have
9(a) majority status. Whether it makes sense to distinguish between
majority and non-majority union members for purposes of extending or
denying Weingarten rights is a different matter. The board did not address
this issue in IBM because the employees in question were nonunion, not
members of a MONMU.
The three members forming the majority of the board that withdrew
Weingarten rights from nonunion members in the IBM decision seemed to
reach that decision, at least in part, because of the absence of a section 9(a)
representative. 79 The three members produced two opinions. Chairman
Battista and Member Meisburg joined in a plurality opinion, with which
Member Schaumber concurred. Member Schaumber's concurrence
explicitly stated that the better construction of the Act is "that the
Weingarten right is unique to employees represented by a [s]ection 9(a)
bargaining representative. "8 ° While Member Schaumber agreed that the
Weingarten right is grounded in section 7, he specified that it was limited
to the unionized workplace.8' He noted further that "it is the presence of a
collective bargaining agreement and the right of access to a 9(a)
representative that establish the 'strong foundation' of the section 7 right to
79. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1295 (2004). Those members were Chairman
Battista, and Members Schaumber and Meisburg. Member Schaumber wrote a concurring
opinion with Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg. Members Liebman and Walsh
joined in a dissent. Id.
80. Id. at 1295 (Schaumber, concurring).
81. Id. at 1295 n.4.
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representation at an investigatory interview. 8 2 Schaumber quoted from the
Supreme Court's decision in Emporium Capwell that "[c]entral to the
policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the employees elect that
course, is the principle of majority rule."83 Schaumber's view would not
lend itself to extension of the Weingarten right to MONMU members
because he connects the right to a section 9(a) representative, which a
MONMU, by its very nature as a non-majority representative, is not.
The IBM plurality opinion is lengthy. In some places it refers to
section 9(a), but in others simply to a nonunion setting. In the analysis and
conclusions section, the authors of the plurality state that they are
"[r]eturning to the earlier precedent of DuPont, which holds that
Weingarten rights do not apply in a nonunion setting. 84 That opinion goes
on to describe that "[t]he issue of whether to hold that Weingarten rights
apply or do not apply in a nonunionized workplace requires the Board to
choose between two permissible interpretations of the Act."85 The plurality
opinion, in choosing between its two permissible interpretations, repeatedly
referred to the nonunion, not the non-majority union context. That,
however is largely because it was deciding a nonunion and not a non-
majority case. In the ordinary use of language, it is somewhat difficult to
equate the term nonunion with non-majority union. And yet the general
understanding or presumption in labor law today is that a unionized
environment refers to one where there is an exclusive majority
representative. 6 Nonetheless, it may be argued that as far as section 9(a)
restricting the Weingarten right is concerned, the actual language of section
9(a) refers to exclusive majority representation in the collective bargaining
and grievance contexts.87 In no way does section 9(a) speak to the right to
representation at an investigatory interview, a situation where even a
majority union does not have the right to bargain with the employer. In
fact, the employer may insist on silence from the union representative
while the investigatory interview proceeds. The employer also has a clear
82. Id. at 1303.
83. Id. (citing Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 62 (1975)).
84. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1289 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. See IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1299 (Schaumber, concurring) (equating nonunion with
no section 9(a) representative through the following language: "employee in a nonunion
setting, that is, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement and a 9(a)
representative").
87. See supra note 10 (citing text of section 9); see also supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text (discussing section 9).
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right to forego the interview altogether if the union member requests the
88presence of his representative.
The IBM plurality opinion discusses the Supreme Court's decision in
Weingarten, the genesis of the right, and its subsequent development.8 9
The plurality noted that the Weingarten Court "derived [the right] from
section 7 of the Act giving employees the right to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection." 90 Weingarten itself "did not address
the situation in which an employee of a nonunionized employer asks for a
co-worker to be present as his representative. '" 91 However, when the Board
first considered the case of a non-unionized employee asking for a co-
worker, the Board found that a Weingarten right existed in a nonunion
setting because it was based upon section 7 of the Act.92 Three years later,
the Board abandoned that position in Sears Roebuck & Co., where it
determined that the Weingarten right required a certified or recognized
union.93 The Sears board found that the employer's right to deal with its
employees on an individual basis prevailed "in the absence of a union.
9 4
The IBM plurality then outlined how the Sears decision was modified
upon remand from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, noting that
"unrepresented employees do not possess a section 7 right to the presence
of a fellow employee in an investigatory interview."95 When the Board
overruled DuPont in Epilepsy Foundation, it emphasized that the "right to
representation is grounded in section 7 of the Act which protects the right
of employees to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection
... and that 'section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees and are in no
wise dependent on union representation for their implementation. '5
96
88. N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 258 (1975) ("The employer is free to
...leave to the employee the choice between having an interview unaccompanied by his
representative, or having no interview and foregoing any benefits that might be derived from
one.").
89. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1290.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982)).
93. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck and Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985)).
94. Id. at 1291.
95. Id. (citing DuPont, 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 629-30 (1988)) (emphasis added). The IBM
decision noted that the three reasons the Board outlined in DuPont were that an employee
representative in a nonunion setting has no obligation to represent the entire workforce
unlike a union representative, is less likely to have the skills necessary than a union
representative, and that a nonunion employee would likely lose his only chance to present
his defense since no grievance procedure would supply a second chance. It should be noted
that all except the second of these reasons would apply equally to a union member in a
MONMU as to a nonunion employee.
96. Id. (quoting Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 678 (2000), affd in relevant part,
268 F.3d 1095 (D.C.Cir. 2001), and Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311
(1978)).
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The IBM plurality noted that the Epilepsy decision rejected the three
policy concerns expressed in DuPont when it revoked Weingarten rights
for nonunion employees.97 The IBM plurality returned to the result and
rationale of DuPont, specifically holding that "the Weingarten right does
not extend to the nonunion workplace."9' The first concern from DuPont,
that of coworkers not representing the interests of the entire work force,
could be said to apply equally to union representatives in a MONMU since
the union representative would not be obligated to represent nonunion
members. However, the members-only representative would represent the
interests of all of its members equally, and unlike the concern expressed in
DuPont, and repeated in IBM, there would be a group to represent, and a
designated representative. Additionally, the representative would be a
union representative, not a mere coworker, thus removing some of the
concern expressed in these earlier nonunion context cases such as DuPont
and IBM. 99
The second concern, that coworkers cannot redress the imbalance of
power between employers and employees, is ameliorated somewhat by the
presence of a union representative instead of a coworker. Particularly
because, as the IBM plurality noted, "a union representative has a different
status in his relationship with an employer than does a coworker."' 00 While
the power of a non-majority union representative is not equivalent to that of
a majority representative who has the full bargaining unit behind him, the
representative does have "knowledge of the workplace and its politics" and
an "official status."''°
The third concern in DuPont, reiterated in IBM, is the lack of skills
that coworkers have in comparison to a union representative. This concern
is clearly ameliorated in the non-majority union context because of the
presence of a skilled union representative. In IBM, the plurality noted the
"critical difference between a unionized work force and a nonunion work
force is that the employer in the latter situation can deal directly with
employees on an individual basis."'0 2 The doctrine prior to Epilepsy, where
a nonunion employer could have contacts with individual employees, was
preferable to the IBM plurality.'0 3
97. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1291. See supra note 95 (citing the three concerns expressed
by the Board in DuPont).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 1291-92.
100. Id. at 1292.
101. See id. Because a MONMU does not represent a majority of the bargaining unit, it
is not equivalent in power or legal status to a section 9(a) representative.
102. Id.
103. Id.
2008]
618 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:3
The IBM plurality discussed additional concerns to those expressed in
DuPont. Their fourth concern with coworkers was confidentiality.
3 4
Though they recognized that confidentiality is a concern even in a
unionized setting, the plurality noted in IBM that "the dangers are far less
when the assisting person is an experienced union representative with
fiduciary obligations and a continuing interest in having an amicable
relationship with the employer."' ' The plurality in IBM sought to defend
itself from the allegations of the dissent. The plurality wrote that they were
"not saying that a nonunion employee lacks a Section 7 right to seek
mutual aid and assistance from a fellow employee .... Our only holding is
that the nonunion employer has no obligation to accede to the request, i.e.,
to deal collectively with the employees.', 0 6  They saw their view as
distinguishing nonunion from unionized employers on the basis that the
unionized employer is not free to deal with the employees individually
regarding employment related matters of potential discipline, whereas the
nonunion employer is free to deal with individuals.
10 7
The conclusion of the plurality opinion in IBM stated that "in a
unionized setting, the employees have a Section 9 representative, and this
consideration outweighs the employer's need for private inquiry."'0 8 The
plurality's reference to the presence of a section 9(a) representative refers
to the employer's duty to deal with the statutory representative rather than
directly with the employees as they would be free to do in the absence of
the representative. Since the Board was not faced with a MONMU in IBM,
that was not the issue before it. Thus, it seems premature to construe the
statement of the plurality as precluding Weingarten rights for union
members in a MONMU. Nonetheless, there is certainly room for caution
in light of the plurality's reference to section 9(a) and the limitations it
places on employers' ability to deal directly. Because the Board's Division
of Advice refused to find a duty to bargain with a MONMU in Dick's
Sporting Goods, they might also find that an employer has no obligation to
allow a union representative to accompany a MONMU member in the
Weingarten context, or in the alternative, forego the interview altogether.
One of the three Board members who voted to restrict Weingarten
rights to a union setting in the IBM case, Member Meisburg, was later
replaced, and Meisburg is now the General Counsel of the Board. 09 The
104. Id. at 1114.
105. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1114.
106. Id. at 1115 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 1115-16.
108. Id. at 1116.
109. Ronald Meisburg is now serving as General Counsel for the N.L.R.B. See
N.L.R.B., Board, Member Biographies, http://nlrb.gov/AboutUs/Overview/board/ and
N.L.R.B., General Counsel,
http://www.nlrb.gov/About%5FUs/Overview/general%5Fcounsel/, (last visited March 2,
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Board entered 2008 with three vacancies; the two remaining members are
Liebman and Schaumber."0  The Presidential nomination of former
Chairman Battista, whose term expired December 16th, former Member
Walsh, whose term expired December 31st, and Gerard Morales, a
management attorney, have not yet been confirmed by the Senate.1 '
Members whose backgrounds lie in representing management would seem
more likely than Members Liebman and Walsh to agree with the reasoning
of the majority in IBM, that is, to limiting the Weingarten right to situations
where there is a union or a section 9(a) representative.
The two members who would have retained Weingarten rights for
nonunion members in the IBM case, Members Liebman and Walsh, relied
upon section 7 rather than section 9(a). They relied upon the language of
the statute itself which provides employees with the right to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection, as well as
on the reasoning in the Epilepsy Foundation case.' 1 2 Members Liebman
and Walsh stated their position clearly: "We believe ... that the Supreme
Court's decision in Weingarten supports the right to representation, even in
nonunion settings, because that right is grounded in Section 7 . ... ",,3 The
use of a coworker representative as opposed to a union one makes no
difference in terms of section 7 rights, and thus the concerns raised by the
majority that echo those raised in DuPont-representing the entire
workforce, redressing the imbalance of power, and having the requisite
skills to be effective-are not relevant.' 4  Essentially, "requiring a
nonunion employer to permit coworker representation (if it chooses to
2008). It is interesting that former Board Member Meisburg, now General Counsel, has
been in the news because of picketing by N.L.R.B. employees asking him to resign due to
his failure to bargain with a combined unit of employees, a bargaining unit determination
made by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. See N.L.R.B., N.L.R.B. Employees Picket
D.C. Headquarters Over General Counsel's Refusal to Bargain, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA),
No. 158, Aug. 16, 2007, at A-4.
110. Susan J. McGolrick, N.L.R.B. Enters New Year With Three Vacancies, Two
Members Issuing Decisions, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 19, Jan. 30, 2008, at S-9.
111. Id. The Board delegated its decision-making authority to a panel of three members
so that the two remaining members would constitute a quorum with decision-making
authority. General Counsel Meisburg has been "temporarily delegated litigation authority
.. . to defend board decisions and initiate injunction proceedings." Id. It is uncertain
whether the Senate will confirm the President's nominations, as Sen. Edward M. Kennedy,
chair of the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, spoke strongly against the
re-nomination of Battista. Susan J. McGolrick, N.L.R.B., President Renominates Battista,
Walsh, Nominates Morales to Fill Board Vacancies, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 17, Jan.
28, 2008, at A-7.
112. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1305-1310 (citing Epilepsy Found. v. N.L.R.B.,
268 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000)
(Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting).
113. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1306.
114. Id. at 1308.
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conduct an investigatory interview) is not the equivalent of requiring the
employer to bargain with, or deal with, the representative." ' 5 Member
Liebman continues on as a Board member at this time, but clearly it would
take more members with this view to change the precedent set in IBM. It
seems clear that the IBM dissenters would support Weingarten rights for
MONMU members based upon section 7 and also that the concerns
expressed by the majority regarding the status and skills of the
representative are somewhat assuaged if the employee's requested
Weingarten representative is a MONMU steward.
B. The United States Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten
What did the United States Supreme Court state in the Weingarten
decision that is relevant to the question of whether MONMU members
have Weingarten rights or not? The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Brennan, ruled that the Board's finding was a permissible interpretation of
the Act, namely that an employer's failure to grant the right of union
representation at an investigatory interview that reasonably might lead to
discipline "interfered with, restrained, and coerced the individual right of
the employee, protected by § 7 [of the Act], 'to engage in ... concerted
activities for . . . mutual aid or protection' . . . .16 Thus, the Court
concluded that when an employer denied an employee his statutory
representative in this context, a section 8(a)(1) violation occurred." 7
Limits were placed on the right, but it was clearly grounded in section 7
according to the Board and this construction was upheld by a majority of
the Supreme Court." 8  In fact, the Court was clear that the Board's
construction "in no wise exceeds the reach of § 7, but falls well within the
scope of the rights created by that section."" 9 This was so "even though
the employee alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome; he seeks
'aid or protection' against a perceived threat to his employment
security. ' ' O As the majority noted, "[a] knowledgeable union
representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and
save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident
... ,,121 The right that the Board construed and a majority of the Supreme
Court confirmed was "in full harmony with actual industrial practice" and
115. Id. at 1308.
116. N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 252 (1975).
117. Id. at 257 (citing Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972)).
118. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260.
119. Id. at 265.
120. Id. at 260.
121. Id. at263.
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is a right that is accorded employees in many collective bargaining
agreements and by arbitrators.
1 2
Three Justices dissented in the Weingarten case.23 Chief Justice
Burger wrote a separate opinion in which he objected not to the Board's
new rule but to its lack of explanation or reasoning. 24 Thus he would have
remanded to the Board for it to explain the reasoning behind its change in
policy. 2 1  Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, also dissented.
2 6
Justice Powell wrote that he did not see the "right to have a union
representative or another employee present at an investigatory interview"
as grounded in section 7, and, in fact, thought that the right to
representation should be left to the bargaining process.2 7 It is interesting
from the perspective of MONMU members that the dissenters explicitly
referred to the Weingarten right being available to employees in the
absence of a union representative. "While the Court speaks only of the
right to insist on the presence of a union representative, it must be assumed
that the § 7 right today recognized, affording employees the right to act 'in
concert' in employer interviews, also exists in the absence of a recognized
union."'2 8  Further, the dissenters criticized the efficacy of the
representative in this process because the Board reflected that these were
not bargaining sessions and that the employer could insist on hearing only
the employee's version of the facts. 2 9 Thus, "[a]bsent employer invitation,
it would appear that the employee's § 7 right does not encompass the right
to insist on the participation of the person he brings with him to the
investigatory meeting. The new right thus appears restricted to the
privilege to insist on the mute and inactive presence of a fellow employee
or a union representative ....",0 The dissenters concluded that the type of
"personalized interview" involved in these cases was not "concerted
activity.'
3 1
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's construction of section 7's
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection as including the
Weingarten right to representation.132 Because the case involved a section
122. Id. at 267.
123. Id. at 268-75. Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate dissenting opinion; Justice
Powell wrote a dissent in which Justice Stewart joined.
124. Id. at 268 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 269.
126. Id. at 270 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 270 n.1 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)
(emphasis added)).
129. Id. at 273.
130. Id. at 273 n.5 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 275.
132. Id. at 260.
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9(a) representative, the Court referred to a statutory representative in
numerous instances. However, the dissenters also thought that the right as
grounded in section 7 would be construed to apply even in a nonunion
context. The majority noted that the NLRA was designed to eliminate the
inequality of bargaining power inherent in the employer-employee
relationship, and noted the advantages of the "more experienced kind of
counsel which their union steward might represent."'133 Arguably, a union
steward in a MONMU would be able to offer experienced counsel as well
as assist somewhat with equalizing the power imbalance.
IV. THE NLRA's PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES AT INVESTIGATORY
INTERVIEWS: THE CONTOURS OF THE WEINGARTEN RIGHT
It is clear that there is a Weingarten right available to employees who
request representation where they have a section 9(a) majority union. It is
not clear from current precedent, however, that union members in a
MONMU have a correlative right. In general, a Weingarten right is not
unduly intrusive upon management rights. In fact, the right is somewhat
limited. First, the right is limited to instances where an employee
reasonably fears that the investigatory interview may lead to discipline, and
does not apply to interviews where an employee is merely informed of an
already-determined disciplinary decision.'34 Second, even where a union
member requests to have a union representative at an investigatory
interview that may reasonably lead to disciplinary action, the employer
need not acquiesce to the union member's request. Instead, an employer
may decide to eliminate the interview and proceed with alternative
investigation and/or discipline. Since the IBM decision, the Board has
maintained its position that an employee's request for a Weingarten
representative is protected activity, even in a nonunion environment, and
that the request should not be the basis for retaliation.'35 Finally, if the
133. Id. at 262 n.7 (quoting Indep. Lock Co., 30 Lab. Arb. Rep. 744, 746 (1958)).
134. See LIR-USA Mfg. Co., 306 N.L.R.B. 298, 305 (1992) (finding union
representation unnecessary in a meeting solely to impose previously-decided discipline); see
also El Paso Elec. Co., 2007 WL 674333, at *9 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Mar. 1, 2007)
("[W]here an employer informs an employee of a disciplinary action and then questions the
employee to seek information to bolster that decision, the employee's right to representation
applies.") (quoting Titanium Metals Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 766 (2003)).
135. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 1287, 1288 (2004) (citing IBM Corp., 341
N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004)). On remand, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005 WL 2874750, at *3 n.6
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Oct. 25, 2005), the Administrative Law Judge applied IBM
retroactively and upheld the legality of the discharge, finding that Wal-Mart was motivated
equally by the employee's request for a witness and by his refusal to participate in the
interview without a witness. Subsequently, the charging party asked the Board to reconsider
its decision to apply IBM retroactively, and a three-member panel of the Board ultimately
found that the discharge violated section 8(a)(1) of the N.L.R.A. under the precedent prior to
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employer acquiesces to the presence of a union representative, the
employer need not bargain with the representative, and may insist on
hearing only the employee's account.
3 6
The Board has broad discretion to interpret the NLRA to decide which
interests deserve protection and in which contexts such protection applies.
In the union context, two investigatory interview cases are of interest when
determining the present contours of the Weingarten right. In one case, the
Board held out for an employee's choice of union representative. This
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In
another case, the Board elevated the employer's interest in confidentiality,
perhaps unduly, at the expense of the union's access to information relative
to processing a grievance.
A. The Union Employee Has the Choice ofRepresentative
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit enforced a decision of the Board, affirming a decision by an
Administrative Law Judge that the right to representation under Weingarten
includes an employee's request for a particular shop steward. 3 ' The Fourth
Circuit referred to the Board's "Representation Rule" and upheld it as
"rational and consistent" with the Act.'38 As the Supreme Court interpreted
the Act in Weingarten, the Fourth Circuit found that it "generally
contemplates that an employee will have his choice as to union
representation . . . .The choice of a representative plainly furthers the
ability of workers to seek such aid and protection."'3 9 The outcome of this
case is positive in terms of protecting employee rights in the investigatory
interview context. The Board appeared to understand that an employee
generally has valid reasons for insisting upon his choice. However, the
case does not provide any right to most private sector employees since it
only applies to union employees and the number unionized is so small.
40
IBM. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 17 at *9, 182 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1474 (2007)
(Members Liebman and Walsh concluded that "retroactive application of IBM would lead to
a manifest injustice.").
136. N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 259-60 (1975); see O'Brien, supra
note 31, at 117 n.32-35 (discussing limits of the Weingarten right).
137. 338 F.3d 267, 274-75 (4th Cir. 2003).
138. Id. at 274 n.10 (noting applicable standard and that the issue is whether the
"Board's interpretation is a 'defensible construction of the statute') (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 275. As the appellate court noted, "[a]bsent extenuating circumstances, an
employer has no interest in selecting between available representatives. By contrast,
employees do have an interest." Id. at 275 n. 11 (emphasis in original). In Anheuser-Busch,
the employee sought a steward who was familiar with the circumstances surrounding the
investigation. Id. In other circumstances, a steward that the employee feels more
comfortable with might be advantageous.
140. See supra note 13 (citing 2007 unionization statistics).
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B. The NIPSCO Case-Confidential Notes of Investigatory Interview Need
Not Be Disclosed to the Union
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (NIPSCO), a post-IBM NLRB
decision relating to parties' rights in investigatory interviews, involved an
employer's investigation of a bargaining unit employee's complaint of
threatening conduct by a supervisor. 141  The supervisor allegedly
approached the employee "and stated, 'Peace, love, and understanding, and
then you empty the clip,' while pointing his finger at [the employee] as if it
were a gun." 142 In another incident, the supervisor reminded the employee
of a pistol that the supervisor owned and stated, "[D]eath means nothing to
me." 43 The employee and his union representative met with management
concerning the supervisor's threatening manner. The employee ultimately
filed a formal grievance in light of the employer's duty to provide a safe
workplace under the collective bargaining agreement.'
44  Meanwhile,
NIPSCO's equal employment opportunity manager/labor relations
coordinator proceeded to discuss the matter with the complaining
employee, the supervisor, and the supervisor's supervisor. She prefaced
each interview with a promise of confidentiality and her notes of the
interviews were typed up on a password-protected computer.
45
The Board delegated its authority to a three-member panel. Two of
the three members found that the employer did not violate section 8(a)(5)
of the Act where it furnished the Union with names of those interviewed,
but refused to furnish the interview notes because of the express promise of
confidentiality. 46 The Board found that the employer had a "legitimate and
substantial confidentiality interest in the information requested by the
Union." 47 The majority of a Board panel ruled in favor of confidentiality
and against the right of the union to have full access to information that it
arguably might need in order to fully represent its member in the context of
a grievance. This case is problematic in that it restricts the employer's duty
to provide information to a union relative to processing a grievance. The
employer was operating in a union context, but by promising
confidentiality to those interviewed, it avoided the obligation to share the
notes of those interviews with the statutory representative. The decision
seems to flow rather unfortunately from the rationale expressed in IBM
where the Board cited post-9/1l confidentiality concerns as part of its
141. 347 N.L.R.B. No.17, 179 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1305 (2006).
142. Id. at *1.
143. Id. at *1 n.6.
144. Id. at*1.
145. Id.
146. Id. Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber formed the majority of the panel
while Member Liebman dissented. Id. at *7-* 10.
147. Id. at *2.
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rationale for withdrawing Weingarten rights from nonunion employees.' 41
Member Liebman dissented from the NIPSCO decision, noting among
other things, that the confidentiality issue should not be a concern in light
of the discretion that the union would exercise in light of its duty of fair
representation to NIPSCO's employees.'
49
V. CONCLUSION
Unions continue to decrease in power and membership in the post-
industrial age. In fact, unions have declined in the private sector to the
point where one wonders why we should even consider the NLRB's rulings
as having a significant impact on the American workplace. Nonetheless,
Board rulings do have an impact because of rights that apply to all
employees-not just those represented by a union-and because the NLRB
sets forth the primary model for industrial relations, however dated or
anachronistic that model may seem. Even for those employees who are
union members, recent NLRB rulings and administrative actions tend to
favor employer rights over employee rights or non-majority collective
rights. For those employees who are not union members, rights have
diminished even further. This tendency is unlikely to change unless and
until the composition of the Board changes pursuant to a change in
appointments brought about by a new and different Presidential
administration, including the appointment of a more labor-friendly General
Counsel. 50
It seems unlikely that the present Board is ready to change its position
on the representational and bargaining rights of employees who belong to
non-majority unions. In a similar vein, even though we may not have heard
the last word on Weingarten rights from the Board, if the Weingarten right
hinges on 9(a) exclusive bargaining agent status, then members in a
MONMU are unlikely to benefit from the right in the current legal and
political environment. While the Board has not spoken directly to the
Weingarten rights in MONMUs issue, it has said enough about the lack of
rights of non-majority unions in general to discourage even the most
optimistic believer in MONMUs as a new method or wave for organizing.
Professor Morris' theories on MONMUs have energized many people to
think about new alternatives to the present NLRB-sanctioned election
system and the section 9(a) "imprimatur." Labor law scholars continue to
debate the efficacy and the legal angles of support, while some employees
148. Id. at *3 (citing IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. at 1291-94).
-149. Id. at *7 n.6 (Member Liebman, dissenting).
150. See Greenhouse supra note 73 (discussing need to appoint new N.L.R.B. members
in order for rule to be adopted); see also supra note 109 (discussing the current General
Counsel of the N.L.R.B.).
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and unions have taken up the charge and worked towards testing the
theories. Since the current Board does not seem to be on board with
Professor Morris' train of thought on MONMUs, the naysayers of The Blue
Eagle may be enjoying a momentary sense of superiority. But, the
naysayers had better not rest on their laurels. Even if MONMUs are not
going to make an immediate difference for unions, in the long run, their
very existence is a symptom of the momentum building towards change.
The present statutorily-authorized and NLRB-managed system for
obtaining union certification is not working well for unions. Thus, there is
an incentive for them to find a better method; a way to get back on track in
the twenty-first century. Perhaps if the Employee Free Choice Act is
enacted, it would provide a better way for American unions to regain their
strength (i.e., wherever they are able to get a majority to sign authorization
cards in a bargaining unit).'51 And perhaps if the political winds blow in a
new direction, MONMUs will have their shot at reviving collective
bargaining, and The Blue Eagle will fly high once again.
151. See Thomas A. Kochan & John Paul Ferguson, Modernizing Labor Law, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 21, 2007, at A9 (recommending enactment of the Employee Free Choice Act
with two provisos: (1) have federal agencies gather data-tracking effects of card checks and
elections; and (2) have Secretary of Labor make the data available for independent
evaluation and report to Congress on the assessment).
